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DISGUST AND THE PROBLEMATIC
POLITICS OF SIMILARITY
Courtney Megan Cahill*
FROM DISGUST To HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION & CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW. By Martha C. Nussbaum. Oxford and New York: Oxford University
Press. 2010. Pp. xxiv, 217. $21.95.
INTRODUCTION
Martha Nussbaum's latest book, From Disgust to Humanity: Sexual
Orientation & Constitutional Law,' could not have come at a more opportune
time in the history of gay rights in the United States. All signs point to pro-
gress toward "humanity," from same-sex couples' successful bids for marriage
equality in a handful of states to the public's increasing acceptance of the
prospect of gays and lesbians serving openly in the military.' Even if recent
cognitive science research indicates that same-sex relationships provoke more
than a little disgust in some people,4 landmark marriage-equality victories in a
few states suggest that the law is far less willing to tolerate that disgust as a
valid basis for discriminatory and exclusionary legislation.! And unlike
its culture-war comrade abortion, homosexuality has become less, not more,
6taboo over time. Whereas abortion is rarely, if at all, mentioned on
* Visiting Associate Professor of Political Science, Brown University; Professor of Law,
Roger Williams University School of Law; J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D., Princeton University;
B.A., Columbia University.
1. Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics, University of Chicago.
2. Five states and one district now recognize marriage equality for same-sex couples, three
by legislative enactment alone (New Hampshire, Vermont, and Washington, D.C.) and three by
judicial mandate (Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Iowa). One state, California, recognizes same-
sex marriages that were entered into in California before Proposition 8 was passed in November
2008, but does not recognize any marriages between same-sex couples that were entered into after
that time.
3. See Carl Hulse, Senate Repeals Ban Against Openly Gay Military Personnel, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 2010, at Al; Dalia Sussman, New Poll Shows Support for Repeal of 'Don't Ask Don't Tell,'
N.Y. TIMES THE CAUCUs (Feb. 11, 2010, 1:58 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/
11 /new-poll-shows-support-for-repeal-of-don't-ask-don't-tell/.
4. See Yoel Inbar et al., Disgust Sensitivity Predicts Intuitive Disapproval of Gays, 9 Emo-
TION 435 (2009).
5. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 445 (Conn. 2008) (recogniz-
ing that "visceral prejudice" is one reason why gays and lesbians constitute a quasi-suspect class
under the Connecticut Constitution).
6. See Hadley Freeman, Abortion is the one taboo left in the world of comedy: Why Family
Guy has offended everyone, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Aug. 19, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.
co.uk/commentisfree/2009/aug/19/family-guy-abortion-hadley-freeman (discussing the Fox net-




television,' homosexuality, as Nussbaum points out, is becoming a virtual
regular on primetime (p. xviii). Indeed, if the gay couple on ABC's Modem
Family is any indication, homosexuality--or at least a very domesticated
version of it-has begun to lose its taint.
In documenting this progressive movement from a "politics of disgust"
to a "politics of humanity" (pp. xvii-xviii), Nussbaum's book tends to mim-
ic it, starting at the low point of sodomy's criminalization in American law
(Chapter Three); moving toward the significantly higher points of
Romer v. Evans,' Lawrence v. Texas,' and the marriage-equality movement
(Chapter Five); and ending with a gesture toward a world "after disgust,"
one in which "progress . . . is ... complete" (p. 208). To reach this post-
disgust zenith, Nussbaum maintains that we must exercise not only our re-
spect for others but also our imagination, the latter of which she defines as
the capacity to "participat[e] in the lives of others" (p. xix), to identify with
the situation of another "and see it as relevantly similar" (p. 48) to one's
own, and to "see the other as a center of perception, emotion, and reason,
rather than an inert object" (p. xix). "The politics of humanity includes," she
asserts, "both respect and imagination, and imagination understood as an
ingredient essential to respect itself' (p. xix). In this, Nussbaum weds her
more recent work on sexuality and disgusto with her earlier work on litera-
ture and the literary imagination." The "literary imagination," which
Nussbaum wrote of fifteen years earlier, is "an essential part of both the the-
ory and the practice of citizenship" 2 because it "asks us to concern
ourselves with the good of other people whose lives are distant from our
own."3 There, Nussbaum was concerned with the imagination's relevance
"to public thinking" 4 and to good citizenship in general. Here, she is con-
cerned with the imagination's ability to facilitate a movement from disgust to
humanity in the area of gay rights generally and American law in particular.
From Disgust to Humanity is novel not because it elucidates the role that
disgust has played in the law. To be sure, the book's survey of law and dis-
gust draws from the richly developed theoretical framework of disgust that
7. See Kate Aurthur, Television's Most Persistent Taboo, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2004, § 2, at
27 ("Unlike such once-taboo issues as date rape, gay relationships and teenage sex, abortion on
television remains an aberration.").
8. P. 95; 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
9. P. 85; 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
10. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW
(2004) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY]; Martha C. Nussbaum, "Secret Sewers of
Vice": Disgust, Bodies, and the Law, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 19 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999)
[hereinafter Nussbaum, "Secret Sewers"].
11. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CULTIVATING HUMANITY: A CLASSICAL DEFENSE OF RE-
FORM IN LIBERAL EDUCATION (1997) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, CULTIVATING HUMANITY]; MARTHA
C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE (1995) [hereinafter
NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE].
12. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 52.
13. Id. at xvi.
14. Id. at 5.
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antecedes it." Rather, what is new here is Nussbaum's recommended anti-
dote to disgust. Unlike other theorists of disgust, Nussbaum offers not just a
theory of what it is, but also, and perhaps more importantly, a way to get
past it. That way, she posits, is the politics of humanity, which involves the
exercise of one's imagination and the simultaneous cultivation of similarity
between one and the so-called disgusting other. If the politics of disgust is
all about separation and recoiling from those who disgust you, then the poli-
tics of humanity is all about association and trying to walk in those persons'
shoes for a while-and, in the process, seeing them as people who are in
some sense "like oneself.""
Nussbaum deserves praise for setting forth a possible solution or cure to
disgust's dominion in the realm of sexual orientation and the law. Let's call
that solution or cure the politics of similarity. At the same time, however,
this solution, or at least a strong version of it, suffers from two potential
shortcomings, one descriptive and the other normative.
First, humanity-through-similarity might lead to descriptive imprecision.
Take, for instance, the push for marriage equality by same-sex couples. In
that context, a strong version of Nussbaumian similarity is already well
underway, as advocates have attempted to cast same-sex couples who desire
to marry as "just like" their married heterosexual counterparts in order to
gain the marriage right." While these kinds of "like-straight" arguments
might make sense on a doctrinal level, motivated as they are by the equality
principle and its antecedent philosophical tradition,'9 they tend to distort the
measurable differences that social scientists have found to exist between
same-sex and cross-sex intimate and family structures.20 Indeed, by
embracing such a vigorous account of similarity politics, marriage-equality
advocacy has not just minimized difference but erased it entirely.
15. See generally WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST (1997); NUSSBAUM,
HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 10; Nussbaum, "Secret Sewers", supra note 10; Paul Rozin et
al., Disgust, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS 637 (Michael Lewis & Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones eds.,
2d ed. 2000).
16. Assuming, of course, that we even want or are able to. Some commentators, liberal and
conservative alike, maintain that disgust is a valid basis for lawmaking. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan,
The Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1621 (1998) (reviewing Miller's book
and making the liberal argument for disgust); Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance: Why we
should ban the cloning of humans, NEW REPUBLIC, June 2, 1997, at 17 (making the conservative
argument for disgust). Others are less "sanguine" about the possibility of moving past disgust in the
context of sexual orientation and the law. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, A Lot to Ask: Review Essay of
Martha Nussbaum's From Disgust to Humanity: Sexual Orientation and Constitutional Law, 19
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 89, 94 (2010).
17. P. 48. Here, Nussbaum advocates the application of Roger Williams's vision of religious
equality, which understands each individual as "a person like oneself, struggling with difficult prob-
lems in a confusing world," to the context of sexuality and the law. P. 48.
18. See, e.g., Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality's Horizon, 54 EMORY L.J. 1361 (2005) (dis-
cussing, inter alia, the "like-straight" arguments that have driven marriage-equality advocacy).
19. See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997) (noting, in the context of assisted
suicide, that "[the Equal Protection Clause] embodies a general rule that States must treat like cases
alike but may treat unlike cases accordingly").
20. See infra Section II.B.l.
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Second and more normatively, humanity-through-similarity does very
little to advance a thick notion of cultural, social, and marital pluralism. It is,
in short, not all that imaginative, if by imagination we understand the crea-
tive ability to imagine and respect worlds that are different from our own.2
In prior work, Nussbaum argued that "?art of the idea of flourishing is a
deep respect for qualitative difference."' Here, however, difference takes a
backseat to similarity. As such, the reader is left wondering whether Nuss-
baum's vision of sexual orientation and the law can accommodate the same
sort of difference that she has championed elsewhere. More generally, at the
end of this book one wonders whether actors are capable of moving past
disgust for marginalized out-groups by imagining and "deeply respecting"
even those differences that provoke discomfort. If not, then what we are left
with is a somewhat thin conception of social and cultural pluralism in Amer-
ican law.
Part I provides an overview of From Disgust to Humanity, including
Nussbaum's theory of the imaginative vision and the role that it might play
in facilitating a movement away from disgust and toward humanity. Part II
then critiques that vision and the politics of similarity on which it rests from
both a descriptive and a normative perspective. This Part uses marriage-
equality advocacy as an example of a movement that has adopted a strong
version of Nussbaum's politics of similarity, one that fails to capture the
meaningful differences that exist between gay relationships and their cross-
sex counterparts. Part III finally considers an alternative way to move past
disgust and toward humanity for out-groups generally, one that focuses less
on similarity and more on difference; or, in words written by Nussbaum fif-
teen years ago, one that "attend[s] to citizens in all their concreteness and
variety."2 That way draws from aspects of the Supreme Court's sex equality
jurisprudence, which, far from retreating from difference, has wholeheart-
edly embraced it.
I. FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: A NARRATIVE OF PROGRESS
The law loves progress narratives. "The history of our Constitution,"
Justice Ginsburg intoned in United States v. Virginia, "is the story of the
extension of constitutional rights and protections to people once ignored or
excluded." 4 While such progress narratives might very well be, according to
their skeptics, "progress myths" or even "phony history,"" they are neverthe-
21. See NORTHROP FRYE, THE EDUCATED IMAGINATION 96 (1964) ("The world of literature
is a world where there is no reality except that of the human imagination. We see a great deal in it
that reminds us vividly of the life we know. But in that very vividness there's something unreal.")
(emphasis added).
22. NussBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE, supra note 11, at45 (emphasis added).
23. Id.
24. 518 U.S. 515, 557 (1996).
25. FRYE, supra note 21, at 145 ("Progress myths come into all the phony history that people
use when they say that someone is a 'Puritan,' meaning that he's a prude, or that someone else is
'medieval' or 'mid-Victorian,' meaning that he's old-fashioned.").
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less extremely seductive for those legal actors who aspire to read legal his-
tory as reflecting an ascent from relative benightedness to relative
26
enlightenment.
Nowhere is this tendency to read social and constitutional history in
progressive terms more pronounced, at least right now, than in the context of
civil rights for sexual minorities. For instance, courts that have struck down
exclusionary marriage laws on state constitutional grounds have invoked
narratives of progress that variously conceptualize marriage and the legal
status of gays and lesbians as evolving steadily over time.2 Similarly, cer-
tain champions of marriage equality have conceptualized marriage as the
only institution that will complete gays and lesbians' progress in the law
from outlaw to in-law. As William Eskridge has argued, "As a formal matter,
law's civilizing movement will not be complete until the same-sex married
couple replaces the outlawed sodomite as the paradigmatic application of
law to gay people."28
In the spirit of such progress, From Disgust to Humanity tends to em-
brace a narrative of advancement for gays and lesbians in American law on
both a descriptive and a normative level; indeed, the title alone (from ... to)
invites the reader to consider the relationship between sexual orientation and
constitutional law within a progressive frame. On a descriptive level,
Nussbaum outlines the progress that sexual minorities have in fact made in
the law from disgust-provoking outlaws to (relatively) accepted legal sub-
jects. After setting forth, respectively, the politics of disgust and the politics
of humanity in Chapters One and Two, Nussbaum traces in the next three
chapters what appears to be an ascensional movement, one that starts with
the criminalization of sodomy before Lawrence v. Texas in Chapter Three
(pp. 54-93), progresses toward the Supreme Court's rejection of disgust
politics in Romer v. Evans in Chapter Four (pp. 94-125), and apparently
culminates with some recent marriage-equality victories in Chapter Five-
victories that suggest that at least in some states, the politics of humanity
has triumphed (pp. 126-66).
It is important here to note that Nussbaum is judiciously realistic about
the legal progress that gays and lesbians both have made and will continue
to make moving forward; as such, she avoids giving "the impression that all
past history was a kind of bad dream, which in these enlightened days we've
shaken off."29 For instance, in the sixth and final chapter, Nussbaum docu-
ments the legal domains in which "the politics of disgust is alive and
26. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) ("As the Constitution endures,
persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.").
27. See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, No. CV5965, 2007 WL 2468667, 196 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Aug.
30, 2007) (stating that "[m]arriage has evolved over time" to become a more democratic institution);
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 966-67 (Mass. 2003) (referring to marriage as
an evolving paradigm").
28. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 8 (1996).
29. FRYE, supra note 21, at 145.
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well,"30 if not "on a rampage" (p. 208), even after marriage-equality victo-
ries in some states. In so doing, she challenges, if only implicitly,
Eskridge's assertion that with marriage gays and lesbians' progress from
outlaw to in-law is "complete."" In addition, Nussbaum's concluding
chapter is provocatively entitled "After Disgust?", thus inviting skepticism
over whether moving past disgust is, in fact, possible.32
On a more normative level, Nussbaum argues that the law should aspire
to move past disgust, and she provides a way that it might do so. Thus, even
as she is cautiously optimistic about whether we can move past disgust en-
tirely, Nussbaum is more than certain that we should." She suggests that one
way to do so is to put ourselves in the so-called disgusting other's shoes and
to see the similarities between her world and our own. This Review, as pre-
viously noted, refers to Nussbaum's antidote to disgust as the "politics of
similarity." Before elaborating on that antidote, though, Nussbaum first ex-
plains in greater depth what she means by the politics of disgust in Chapter
One. The politics of disgust, she there argues, "involves a double fantasy: a
fantasy of the dirtiness of the other and a fantasy of one's own purity"
(p. 17). "Both sides of the projection involve false belief' (p. 17), she con-
tinues, "and both conduce to a politics of hierarchy" (p. 17). For Nussbaum,
disgust is so conducive to a "politics of subordination" (p. 18) that it can
almost never constitute a valid basis for legal regulation, even if that regula-
tion also rests on morally and constitutionally defensible rationales. She
says, "We cannot conclude that a policy is wrong simply because it is
backed by a rhetoric of disgust: for there may be other better reasons in its
favor. Disgust, however, often prevents us from looking for those good rea-
sons" (p. 20). Consequently, "[t]urning to [disgust] to legitimize policies
that can be defended in other ways is ... dangerous" (p. 20).
By contrast, the politics of humanity, Nussbaum contends in Chapter
Two, is one of equal respect and antisubordination, the latter of which is "an
idea . . . that stretches back to the nation's founding" (p. 43). To cultivate a
politics of humanity, Nussbaum argues that we must exercise our imagina-
tion: "[W]ithout the ability to imagine the situation of a person in a different
social group and to assess it from that person's point of view," she observes,
true understanding and "equal respect cannot come into being" (p. 47).
30. P. 169. Those domains include "America's legal and political dealings with sex busi-
nesses, bathhouses, and the like," which have been subject to disgust-based regulation in the form of
public nuisance law. P. 169. Nussbaum notes that while such domains "do not concern same-sex
actors only," such "actors . . . face a heightened level of surveillance and disgust-anxiety, as the
intense focus on gay bathhouses reveals." P. 169.
31. Unlike Eskridge, Nussbaum questions whether marriage qua marriage is the only way to
gain access to civil rights. P. 132.
32. That said, in the conclusion to From Disgust to Humanity Nussbaum does suggest that
moving past disgust permanently is possible when she states that "[f]aw needs to do a lot more work
before the progress that is underway in this area will be anything like complete." P. 208 (emphasis
added).
33. See also Nussbaum, "Secret Sewers", supra note 10, at 22 ("[Tlhe specific cognitive
content of disgust makes it always of dubious reliability in social life, but especially in the life of the
law.").
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However interesting, it is here where Nussbaum's theory of humanity-
inducing politics becomes a bit unclear.
On the one hand, Nussbaum argues in some places that a politics of hu-
manity flows both from assessing the situation of a person "from that
person's point of view" (p. 47) and from "an honest confrontation with the
real lives of the group and its members" (p. 123). In this sense, humanity is
achieved by understanding the world of the so-called disgusting other
through that person's eyes rather than necessarily through our own. If that is
the case, then the theory of imaginative vision that Nussbaum articulates
calls to mind her theory of the novel in Poetic Justice. In that prior work,
Nussbaum maintains that the beauty and power of the novel partly resides in
its ability to capture the "qualitative differences"3 (between and among in-
dividuals) as well as "the separateness of persons." 35 To be sure, the novel,
through its attention to particularity, understands that "part of the idea of
[human] flourishing is a deep respect for qualitative difference."36 "Govern-
ment," Nussbaum there argues, should "acknowledge the separateness,
freedom, and qualitative difference of each [citizen] in the manner of the
novel."
On the other hand, however, Nussbaum contends in this most recent
work that a politics of humanity rests on cultivating similarity between one-
self and the disgusting other. For example, and with respect to sexual-
orientation politics specifically, she says, "Before we can attain a politics of
respect in matters of sexual orientation, people have to be able to imagine
what gays and lesbians are pursuing, and see it as relevantly similar to their
own search for personal and sexual integrity and expression" (p. 48). In-
deed, imagination, Nussbaum observes, is what allowed the Supreme Court
in Loving v. Virginia "to see the similarity of the aims of Mildred Jeter and
Richard Loving to the aims of people who seek to marry within their race"
(p. 49). Later on in From Disgust to Humanity, Nussbaum once again casts
humanity politics within the language of similarity: "The politics of human-
ity asks us to stop viewing same-sex marriage as a source of taint or
defilement to traditional marriage, but, instead, to understand the human
purposes of those who seek marriage and the similarity of what they seek to
that which straight people seek" (p. 164). Under this view, if I can slip into
the shoes of the disgusting other for a moment, I might realize that she is not
so different from me-and, consequently, not so disgusting-after all.
Admittedly, Nussbaum appears here to advocate only a weak form of
humanity-through-similarity. For instance, she never says that to move past
disgust we must place ourselves in the shoes of the disgusting other and re-
alize that our goals and aspirations are exactly the same as his. Rather, she is
34. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 28. To be sure, in Poetic Justice Nussbaum
also elucidates the power of the novel to "recognize[] human needs that transcend boundaries of
time, place, class, religion, and ethnicity." Id. at 45.
35. Id. at 32.
36. Id. at 45.
37. Id. at 44.
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careful to qualify the redemptive power of similarity by stating that a poli-
tics of humanity exercises imagination in an effort to see how someone
else's life is "relevantly similar," not exactly similar, to one's own (p. 48). In
this sense, Nussbaum's theory simply reformulates what constitutional
equality guarantees already demand: that all laws treat persons who are si-
milarly situated in relevant ways, not in every way, the same.38 In other
words, complete identicalness is not a necessary condition for either Nuss-
baum's theory or constitutional equality guarantees to apply in any given
situation.
II. MARRIAGE-EQUALITY ADVOCACY AND SIMILARITY POLITICS
The problem with even the weak form of humanity-through-similarity
that From Disgust to Humanity appears to embrace, however, is that it tends
to steer us away from the "deep respect for qualitative difference" that
Nussbaum has elsewhere embraced as an integral "part of the idea of [hu-
man] flourishing." 9 Moreover, weak forms of similarity politics can easily
cede to strong forms of similarity politics and to arguments that demand that
individuals be treated the same because they are, in fact, the same-
arguments that do not necessarily require us to exercise our imagination in
ways that are all that imaginative. While a strong form of Nussbaumian si-
milarity might get us past disgust and closer to humanity-and even that is
debatable-it does not necessarily accomplish this objective in ways that are
either normatively or descriptively desirable. Marriage-equality advocacy,
which has embraced a strong form of similarity politics, offers a good case
in point. Section II.A will briefly summarize marriage equality's similarity
politics. Section II.B will then critique similarity politics generally from
both a descriptive and a normative perspective.
A. Marriage Equality's Similarity Politics
Legal advocacy for marriage equality has overwhelmingly relied on a
litigation strategy that posits that the state violates constitutional liberty and
equality norms when it denies same-sex couples the right to marry because
those couples are similarly situated in nearly every respect to their cross-sex
counterparts. Professor Marc Spindelman refers to this line of argumenta-
tion as "[1]ike-[sltraight" reasoning, which he defines as the claim that
"[1]esbians and gay men are just like heterosexuals" and so must be given
"the same rights and privileges heterosexuals receive."4 "Seductively sim-
38. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 882-83 (Iowa 2009) ('[Tlhe similarly situated
requirement cannot possibly be interpreted to require plaintiffs to be identical in every way to peo-
ple treated more favorably by the law.").
39. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 45 (emphasis added).
40. Spindelman, supra note 18, at 1365.
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ple,"41 like-straight reasoning not only posits that gays and straights are (vir-
tually) the same, but also "reinforc[es] the abstract logic that to be equal one
must be the same."42
While like-straight reasoning shaped some of the arguments that gay
rights advocates made to the U.S. Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas,43 it
has played a considerable role in marriage-equality advocacy. In fact, it
would not be an overstatement to say that a politics of similarity has driven
most of the logic on which equality and liberty arguments in favor of mar-
riage for same-sex couples rest. For instance, in response to the traditionalist
marriage claim that same-sex couples can be denied the right to marry be-
cause same-sex marriage is a suboptimal environment in which to have and
raise children, gay advocates have argued that "children raised by gay and
lesbian parents are as likely to be well-adjusted as children raised by hetero-
sexual parents"4 and that "[n]umerous studies of children raised by gay and
lesbian parents conducted over the past 25 years ... show that children
raised by lesbian and gay parents are as successful as children raised by het-
erosexual parents."45 While like-straight reasoning sometimes underlies
claims regarding the similarity between same-sex and cross-sex relation-
ships-including the claim that "lesbian and gay couples often have stable,
committed, enduring relationships that play the same central role in their
lives as they do for heterosexuals"4-it most often centers on the similarity
between gay and straight parenting.
The deployment of like-straight reasoning in marriage-equality advo-
cacy makes sense for at least two reasons, one doctrinal and the other
strategic. Doctrinally, like-straight reasoning simply reflects the formal
equality principle on which federal and state constitutional equality guaran-
tees rest. According to that principle and its antecedent philosophical
tradition, similarly situated individuals, and like cases, must be treated alike;
to do otherwise would be to violate the federal and state constitutions. Op-
ponents of marriage rights for same-sex couples understand this as well as
their marriage-equality counterparts and have tried to convince courts that
those couples are dissimilarly situated from cross-sex couples in all sorts of
ways. As some of the former have argued in marriage litigation, "[T]he
plaintiffs are not similarly situated to opposite-sex couples so as to necessi-
tate further equal protection analysis because the plaintiffs cannot 'procreate
naturally.' "4




44. Final Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 40, Vamum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa
2009) (No. 07-1499).
45. Id. at 40 n.33.
46. Appellees/Cross-Appellants' Supplemental Abstract and Brief at 429, Dep't of Human
Servs. v. Howard, 238 S.W.3d 1 (Ark. 2006) (No. 05-814).
47. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 882 (summarizing the state's argument).
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Strategically, like-straight reasoning has proven enormously successful
with those courts that have struck down exclusionary marriage laws on state
constitutional grounds. For instance, Spindelman explains that "'[l]ike-
straight' reasoning drives [Chief Justice] Marshall's Goodridge opinion start
to end," as the majority there champions "a definition of marriage that has
built into it the idea that lesbians and gay men, hence their relations, are just
like heterosexuals, and theirs."48 More recently, like-straight reasoning per-
meated the Iowa Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Varnum v. Brien.
The court there framed its opinion by positioning gay Iowans in a position
of "like" relative to straight Iowans, noting that "[1]ike most Iowans, gay and
lesbian people are responsible, caring, and productive individuals .... Like
many Iowans, some have children and others hope to have children .... Like
all Iowans, they prize their liberties ......49 It continues this like-straight
theme for the remainder of its opinion, observing that "[1]esbian and gay
parents are as likely as heterosexual parents to provide supportive and
healthy environments for children",o and that "[m]any leading organizations
... supported the conclusion that gay and lesbian parents are as effective as
heterosexual parents in raising children."'
Varnum's persistent reminders of the similarities between the sexual ma-
jority and the sexual minority represent Nussbaum's politics of similarity
writ large. Its claim that "for purposes of Iowa's marriage laws .. . plaintiffs
are similarly situated in every important respect [to heterosexual couples],
but for their sexual orientation,"52 recalls-albeit in more extreme form-
Nussbaum's observation in From Disgust to Humanity that "[t]he politics of
humanity asks us to stop viewing same-sex marriage as a source of taint or
defilement ... but, instead, to understand the human purposes of those who
seek marriage and the similarity of what they seek to that which straight
people seek" (p. 123). Indeed, Nussbaum's emphasis in her book on the "re-
levantly similar" becomes in Varnum a near insistence upon the "completely
similar but for sexuality preference." In heightened Nussbaumian terms, the
Varnum justices attempt to establish "empathy or commonality" (p. 102)
with gays and lesbians by imagining their experiences-and by seeing an
image of themselves in it.
B. Critiquing Similarity Politics
Simply because like-straight reasoning, or a strong version of Nuss-
baumian similarity, makes sense on both a doctrinal and a strategic level
does not mean that it is something that advocates and their supporters
should uncritically embrace. Nussbaum maintains that a politics of human-
48. Spindelman, supra note 18, at 1366-67.
49. Vamum, 763 N.W.2d at 872.
50. Id. at 874.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 883-84.
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ity is predicated "on equal respect and on an attempt to move beyond stereo-
types to an honest confrontation with the real lives of the group and its
members" (p. 123). The strong version of Nussbaumian similarity at play in
marriage-equality discourse, however, arguably does neither of those things.
Instead, the repeated emphasis on similarity all too easily shades into as-
similation to a cross-sex or heterosexual norm that does not accurately
capture the reality-or "real lives"-of the same-sex couples seeking to
marry. While sexual minorities and same-sex couples might achieve "equal
respect" at least some of the time in marriage-equality litigation, it often
comes at the price of downplaying the perceptible differences that do exist
between those individuals and their straight/cross-sex counterparts. However
successful as a litigation strategy, equalizing difference in this way in order
to achieve legal equality is neither descriptively accurate nor normatively
desirable. Similarity politics might very well yield positive legal gains for
sexual minorities. Nevertheless, it is associated with certain costs that de-
mand a closer look.
1. Similarity Politics Is Descriptively Inaccurate
Similarity politics is descriptively inaccurate because it deemphasizes, if
not altogether overlooks, the documented differences that exist between gay
and straight relationships as well as between gay and straight parenting.
Take, for instance, the wealth of literature that exists on the differences be-
tween gay and straight relationships. Relying on longitudinal observational
studies, researchers have shown that gay and lesbian relationships are not
just "fundamentally different from heterosexual relationships,"53 but also
healthier than them in many key respects. Compared to heterosexual cou-
ples, for instance, gay or lesbian couples tend to be "more upbeat in the face
of conflict," using "more affection and humor when they bring up a dis-
agreement."54 Some commentators even note that same-sex couples' relative
egalitarianism is something that "straight couples may have a lot to learn
from."55
In addition, gay and lesbian couples tend to divide and distribute house-
hold and child care labor differently than do their straight counterparts. One
study reports that "being in a same-sex relationship is more important in
53. John Mordechai Gottman & Robert Wayne Levenson, Observing Gay, Lesbian and Het-
erosexual Couples' Relationships: Mathematical Modeling on Conflict Interaction, 45 J.
HOMOSEXUALITY 65, 80 (2003). For a summary of this literature, see Courtney Megan Cahill, Cele-
brating the Differences That Could Make a Difference: United States v. Virginia and a New Vision of
Sexual Equality, 70 OHIo ST. L.J. 943, 974-77 (2009).
54. Gay and Lesbian Couples Research: A case of similarities of same-sex and cross-sex
couples, differences between gay and lesbian couples, THE GOTTMAN RELATIONSHIP INSTITUTE,
http://www.gottman.com/SubPage.aspx?spdt-id=2&sp-id=100842&spt-id=l (summarizing the




equalizing housework than is having similar incomes."6 Whereas recent
empirical work on opposite-sex households has shown that those households
always divide labor unevenly between men and women-with women per-
forming the bulk of home and childcare labor even when they are the
breadwinners"--other work on same-sex couples has shown that they are
"more egalitarian than heterosexual couples regarding the household
tasks." 8 As with same-sex relationship management, same-sex home man-
agement could, according to some, have a salutary effect on opposite-sex
home management. In one commentator's words, "[S]ame-sex couples are a
model for ways of equalizing the division of housework."' 9
Consider also some pro-gay commentators' interest in surveying the dif-
ferences between gay and straight parenting. In 2001, sociologists Judith
Stacey and Timothy Biblarz published what was then a rather controversial
study that challenged the "'no differences' doctrine" that had come to do-
minate comparative research on lesbian and gay parenting.60 While previous
pro-gay research had largely taken a defensive stance on the so-called dif-
ferences between gay and straight parenting because it aimed to debunk the
conservative myth that gays were inferior parents,' Stacey and Biblarz con-
tended that it went too far by overlooking all differences and thereby
"forfeit[ing] a unique opportunity to take full advantage of the 'natural labo-
ratory' that the advent of lesbigay-parent families provided for exploring the
effects and acquisition of gender and sexual identity, ideology, and behav-
ior.",6 Reinterpreting the results of prior empirical work, Stacey and Biblarz
showed that differences between lesbian or gay and straight parenting ex-
isted in three key areas: gender, sexuality, and parenting practices.6 They
concluded that, if anything, the differences between gay and straight parent-
ing "favor the children with" gay and lesbian parents."
Since Stacey and Biblarz's landmark meta-study was published in 2001,
a number of other studies have similarly challenged the so-called no-
differences doctrine that shaped-and often hampered-comparative re-
search on gay parenting for years. Most recently, Abbie Goldberg has
56. Sondra E. Solomon et al., Money, Housework, Sex, and Conflict: Same-Sex Couples in
Civil Unions, Those Not in Civil Unions, and Heterosexual Married Siblings, 52 SEx ROLEs 561,
572 (2005). For a summary of this literature, see Cahill, supra note 53, at 969-79.
57. Lisa Belkin, When Mom and Dad Share All, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2008, § MM (Maga-
zine), at 44 (summarizing these studies).
58. Mally Shechory & Riva Ziv, Relationships between Gender Role Attitudes, Role Divi-
sion, and Perception of Equity among Heterosexual, Gay and Lesbian Couples, 56 SEx ROLEs 629,
635 (2007).
59. Solomon et al., supra note 56, at 572.
60. Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents Mat-
ter?, 66 Am. Soc. REv. 159, 163 (2001).
61. Id. at 162.
62. Id. at 162-63.
63. See id. at 167.
64. Id. at 177.
954 [Vol. 109:943
Problematic Politics of Similarity
underscored the importance of recognizing how growing up with lesbian or
gay parents does make a difference in positive ways for the children in-
volved. Noting that "[f]rom a social constructivist perspective, it is difficult
to believe that having sexual minority parents would fail to have any impact
on individuals' perceptions of themselves, their relationships, and the world
that they live in,"6 Goldberg, like Stacey and Biblarz before her, highlights
significant differences between gay and straight parenting. She identifies
differences along such axes as sexuality and gender, understanding and tol-
eration of differences, and conceptions of family and community6-
differences which, far from operating as deficits, benefit the children of gay
parents.
Because marriage-equality advocacy is so tethered to a robust politics of
similarity, it downplays those differences between gay and straight intimate
and family life-differences that a New York Times columnist recently called
"enlightening." This is not at all to suggest that gays, the relationships into
which they enter, and the families that they raise are not similar in all the
"relevant" ways-to partially quote Nussbaum-that matter to courts hear-
ing constitutional challenges to exclusionary marriage laws (p. 48). It is,
though, to suggest that the strong form of Nussbaumian similarity currently
at play in marriage-equality litigation (and jurisprudence) underrepresents,
sometimes profoundly, the "real lives of the group and its members" under
consideration (p. 123).
2. Similarity Politics Is Normatively Undesirable
Both within and beyond the marriage-equality context, strong forms of
Nussbaumian similarity-and perhaps even a theory of acceptance
predicated on similarity-are normatively undesirable for a number of
related reasons. First, similarity politics is conservative in a way that
progressive critics find objectionable. For instance, Paula Ettelbrick, one of
the first progressive critics of the marriage-equality movement, wrote over
twenty years ago that "[tihe thought of emphasizing our sameness to
married heterosexuals in order to obtain this 'right' terrifies me. ... It robs
me of the opportunity to make a difference." 8 Other progressive critics have
echoed these sentiments, observing that neoliberal marriage rhetoric tends to
project an image of marriage that simply (and unabashedly) "replicates the
65. ABBIE E. GOLDBERG, LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN: RESEARCH ON
THE LIFE CYCLE 164 (2010).
66. See id. at 130-41, 164-68.
67. Lisa Belkin, What's Good for the Kids, N.Y TIMEs, Nov. 8, 2009, § 6 (Magazine), at 9,
11.
68. Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, 1989 OUT/LOOK 9.
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,,69heterosexual one. Under this view, one should not have to sacrifice
70difference in order to be viewed by others as civilized human subjects.
A politics of similarity, or one of humanity-through-similarity, arguably
pushes marriage-equality advocates to turn to like-straight reasoning even
more than they already do. After all, the more that gays look like straights,
the more likely it is that those straights who are unsympathetic to the idea of
same-sex marriage might be able to empathize with those seeking to enter
into that institution, and eventually come around to supporting it. In this
sense, like-straight advocacy and Nussbaumian humanity-through-similarity
work hand in hand, the latter setting the conditions that allow the former to
flourish.
Second, similarity politics might be viewed as a form of "covering," de-
fined by Kenji Yoshino as the rendering of one's identity less obtrusive.7 ,
Yoshino in fact conceptualizes same-sex marriage, at least in part, as a kind
of covering, insofar "as marriage has historically been associated with
straight culture" and "revile[d]" by queers "as an act of assimilation."72
Queers who object to marriage as a form of covering might be more accept-
ing of that institution for same-sex couples if the progressive arguments
made in favor of it did not rest as much as they do on like-straight reasoning
and on the assimilative logic of similarity that they presume.
Third, a politics of similarity does not necessarily "impel courts to look
at difference in life as it is lived."" In this sense, a strong form of humanity-
through-similarity might simply exacerbate the problems that already beset
American antidiscrimination law, which, Yoshino observes, "too often con-
,74flates equality with studious nonperception of difference." While
Nussbaum herself recognizes in From Disgust to Humanity the importance
of confronting "the real lives of the group and its members" (p. 123), she
also articulates a theory for moving past disgust that tends to equate equality
with, if not "nonperception," at least the downplaying of difference.
Fourth, similarity politics, and particularly the strong form of it that is
currently taking shape in the marriage-equality context, might simply be a
kinder, gentler way of regulating the very disgust whose aim it is to tran-
scend. In this sense, humanity-through-similarity might share some of the
less reliable and more suspect characteristics of tolerance discourse. Speak-
ing to tolerance's less savory side, Wendy Brown has written that "[d]espite
its pacific demeanor, tolerance is an internally inharmonious term, blending
69. Suzanna Danuta Walters, Wedding bells and baby carriages: Heterosexuals imagine gay
families, gay families imagine themselves, in THE USES OF NARRATIVE 48, 54 (Molly Andrews et al.
eds., 2004).
70. Marc Spindelman lodges an additional criticism against similarity politics when he ar-
gues that like-straight reasoning renders invisible the "current realities" of domestic violence within
the straight and gay communities alike. See Spindelman, Sodomy Politics, supra note 41.
71. KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 18 (2006).
72. Id. at 91.
73. Id. at 182.
74. Id.
956 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 109:943
Problematic Politics of Similarity
together goodness, capaciousness, and conciliation with discomfort, judg-
ment, and aversion. Like patience, tolerance is necessitated by something
one would prefer did not exist."" Rather than bringing us closer to a repug-
nant other, tolerance, Brown argues, "reduce[s] public engagement with
difference." In the process, it "sacrifice[s] the possibility of developing
deep knowledge of others in their 'difference' and hence the possibility of
substituting such engaged understanding for moralistic distance from or
denunciation of difference."
At first glance, Nussbaum's advocacy of humanity-through-similarity
appears to be the perfect solution to the shortcomings of tolerance. Unlike
tolerance, which maintains a place for disgust by marking out subjects as
different-in Brown's words, as "deviant, marginal, or undesirable by virtue
of being tolerated""7 -humanity-through-similarity attempts to transcend
disgust by refiguring those subjects as similar to ourselves. In Brown's view,
tolerance is all about "managing the presence of the undesirable, the taste-
less, the faulty-even the revolting, repugnant, or vile;"79 in short, tolerance
represents a way to survive amidst a world of difference and deviance. By
contrast, Nussbaumian humanity, far from "a strategy for coping",o with the
otherwise disgusting other, represents a way to embrace her as someone
who is similar to us, and therefore not so disgusting after all. If tolerance
perpetuates difference and thereby contains aversion, then humanity-
through-similarity minimizes difference and thereby moves us beyond that
untrustworthy (at least for Nussbaum) human emotion.
Upon further reflection, however, one wonders whether overcoming
aversion or disgust through the cultivation of empathy and similarity is a
morally satisfying response to the problem of disgust-assuming, of course,
that one even considers disgust to be a problem in the first place, which Nuss-
baum surely does. If part of the problem with an ethic of tolerance is the
"retreat from a political encounter with difference" that it entails, as well as
the "possibility of developing deep knowledge of others in their 'difference'"
that it sacrifices," then arguably humanity-through-similarity is equally prob-
lematic. If, however counterintuitively, an ethic of tolerance merely contains
or regulates aversion by ultimately failing to appreciate, understand, and
embrace difference, then it is not at all clear that humanity-through-similarity
offers us a satisfying alternative. Indeed, because it focuses principally on the
cultivation of similarity rather than on the recognition of difference, human-
ity-through-similarity, like tolerance, appears to foreclose the possibility for
75. WENDY BROWN, REGULATING AVERSION: TOLERANCE IN THE AGE OF IDENTITY AND
EMPIRE 25 (2006).
76. Id. at 88.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 14.
79. Id. at 25.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 88.
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the "deep knowledge of others in their 'difference' " 2 -o--or what Nussbaum
has elsewhere described as the "deep respect for qualitative difference"-
that might be a necessary predicate to real acceptance. Put most simply,
similarity politics might not be the perfect antidote to the dark side of toler-
ance after all.
Fifth and finally, similarity politics is not especially imaginative. In
From Disgust to Humanity, Nussbaum weds together imaginative vision and
humanity by invoking the Ciceronian understanding of humanitas as "a kind
of responsiveness to others that prominently include[s] the ability to imag-
ine their experiences" (p. xviii). Imagining the "real lives" of others,
Nussbaum argues, is the vehicle through which the politics of humanity is
both expressed and achieved. As she observes in her conclusion, "in the area
of sexual orientation . . .. the ideas of contamination and defilement are un-
der siege from the forces of imagination and humanity" (p. 205).
If by imagination Nussbaum means the ability to participate in the lives
of others by seeing an image of ourselves in them, then one must wonder
how imaginative humanity-through-similarity, and particularly the strong
version of it at play in marriage-equality discourse, truly is. "[P]art of the
idea of flourishing," Nussbaum maintains in Poetic Justice, "is a deep re-
spect for qualitative difference," something which literary "fancy" is able to
achieve.84 Literature, under this view, does not necessarily depict the world
that we know. Rather, it is something which, in Northrup Frye's words,
"stretches us vertically to the heights and depths of what the human mind
can conceive.""
"Qualitative difference" and "stretch[ing] ... the human mind," how-
ever, play at best a minimal role in From Disgust to Humanity (and a
nonexistent one in marriage-equality advocacy). Indeed, Nussbaum's most
poignant, if problematic, example of either of those things in the book
appears only at its very end, when she discusses Sean Penn's portrayal of
Harvey Milk in Gus Van Sant's Milk (pp. 206-08). "For a straight man to
allow a gay man's mind and sexuality to enter himself," she contends, "is as
decisive a rejection of the politics of disgust as can be imagined" (p. 208).
Admittedly, there might be some truth to the claim that humanity and the
imaginative vision that facilitates it triumph when a straight man like Penn
inhabits the mind and (at least theoretically) the body of an uncloseted gay
man like Milk. It is important to keep in mind, however, that Nussbaum's
discussion of Penn's performance surfaces in the conclusion to a book that
is largely dedicated to transcending a politics of disgust through the recogni-
tion of similarity rather than through the embrace of difference. Moreover,
Penn's performance was just that-a performance, and an award-winning
one at that-and therefore tells us very little about what inhabiting the life
82. Id.
83. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 45.
84. Id. at 45.
85. FRYE, supra note 21, at 101.
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of another might mean for the average person. Penn's "exuberant" (p. 208)
performance in Milk might simply mean that he is a superior actor and not
necessarily someone who moved past disgust, either temporarily or perma-
nently, by inhabiting a world foreign to his own.
III. DEEPLY RESPECTING DIFFERENCE
It is well beyond the scope of this Review to imagine what a politics of
difference, or one of humanity-through-difference, might look like. Never-
theless, it is worth briefly noting that the Supreme Court's sex equality
jurisprudence, or at least part of it, offers an alternative model to the politics
of similarity both suggested by Nussbaum and enthusiastically embraced by
marriage equality advocacy. In particular, Justice Ginsburg's majority opin-
ion in United States v. Virginia transcends like-straight reasoning and its
assimilative logic in a way that could prove fruitful to those interested in
moving past similarity politics in the context of sexual orientation and the
law. It also provides a useful context in which to consider how to cast argu-
ments in universal ways that are attentive to similarity without sacrificing
particularity and the "deep respect for qualitative difference" that Nussbaum
has elsewhere championed as an essential part of good governance.
The Virginia Court ruled that it was a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause to deny women admission into what was then Virginia's only public
single-sex institution, the Virginia Military Institute ("VMI")." Writing for
the majority, Justice Ginsburg embraced a "distinctive understanding of sex
equality,"8 one that recognized both that inherent "biological and social dif-
ferences between men and women" exist" and that "these differences are to
be 'celebrat[ed],' not turned into a source of inequality."" In her notable
words, "'Inherent differences' between men and women, we have come to
appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the
members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual's oppor-
tunity."1 Virginia is "distinctive'" to partially quote Cass Sunstein,92 because
it recognizes the rich differences that do exist between the sexes but at the
same time is attentive to the similarities and universals that bind them-in
that case, the universal desire on the part of men and women to attend a
quality public military institution. It demonstrates that sex equality, the ac-
knowledgement of difference, and progress-recall Ginsburg's remarks in
86. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
87. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515.
88. Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term: Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided,
110 HARV. L. REv. 4, 74 (1996).
89. Id. at 76.
90. Id.
91. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (citation omitted).
92. Sunstein, supra note 88, at 74.
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Virginia regarding the progress narrative that informs constitutional devel-
opment 93-are by no means mutually exclusive ideals.
Curiously, Justice Ginsburg's Virginia opinion has played a role in the
marriage-equality debate-but mainly on the side of those who oppose mar-
riage for same-sex couples. Citing to Virginia and its author's
acknowledgement of gender difference, opponents have argued that an insti-
tution of both sexes (cross-sex marriage, VMI post-Virginia) is better than
an institution of just one sex (same-sex marriage, VMI pre-Virginia), as even
the Court's most devoted advocate of gender equality has recognized (or so
the argument goes).94 By contrast, with one exception,5 marriage-equality
advocates have shied away from incorporating Virginia into marriage-
equality arguments. Perhaps they fear that Virginia's sex equality logic
could threaten to upend the like-straight reasoning on which so many of the
liberty and equality arguments in favor of marriage equality rest. Indeed, the
sheer pervasiveness of that reasoning makes it difficult imagine gay advo-
cates turning to Virginia in support of the proposition that gays deserve
marriage equality despite the "inherent differences" that exist between them
and straights.96
Notwithstanding Virginia's relative absence from the marriage-equality
project, what might that case bring to it? On the most basic level, Virginia is
an easy fit: in recognizing the differences between a community of one sex
and a community of both sexes-VMI before and after Virginia, respec-
tively-Virginia already provides the foundation for recognizing those
differences between same-sex and cross-sex relationships that sociologists
have widely documented and that this Review discussed earlier.97 In addi-
tion, because Virginia challenges "the abstract logic that to be equal one
must be the same," 8 it paves the way for advocates to argue, for example,
that "[j]ust as we celebrate the differences between the genders, so we can
recognize and celebrate the different experiences that same-sex and oppo-
site-sex relationships contribute to the ... tapestry of our community.""
Perhaps most important from a sociopolitical perspective, Virginia could
lead to greater inclusiveness within the gay civil rights movement. It would
likely appeal to those progressive critics who have faulted the marriage-
equality movement for being decidedly conservative and unapologetically
imitative of heterosexual norms and practices.'" At the very least, Virginia
offers progressives the opportunity of having a conversation about incorpo-
93. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
94. For a summary of these arguments, see Cahill, supra note 53, at 990-94.
95. Brief of Amici Curiae Onelowa et al. at 25, Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa
2009) (No. 07-1499) (citing Virginia).
96. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
97. See supra Section II.B. .
98. Marc Spindelman, Sodomy Politics, supra note 41.
99. Brief of Amici Curiae Onelowa et al., supra note 95, at 25.
100. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
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rating the idea of difference into the arguments on which gay advocates rely
in order to secure equal treatment-a conversation that marriage-equality
advocacy's strong form of similarity politics has not allowed to flourish, let
alone take place at all.
CONCLUSION
Nussbaum is one of the first theorists of disgust to offer not just a cri-
tique of it, but also, and importantly, a way to move past it. In many ways,
her recommendations with respect to the cultivation of humanity through
empathy, identification, and similarity recall Kenji Yoshino's own recent
suggestion that in pursuing civil rights, advocates turn away from equality
claims "asserted by a subset of the population" in favor of liberty claims
"about freedoms we all hold."'o' He observes that the Supreme Court, which
has "shift[ed] toward a more universal register," is likely more willing to
entertain civil rights claims if they are couched in the language of universal
"human rights" than if they are cast in the rhetoric of particular identity poli-
tics.'" While surely not an inherently bad thing, couching equality claims in
the language of universal desire, as with transcending disgust for the other
by noting our similarities to or with her, fails to address the "studious non-
perception of difference"'03 that has unfortunately come to dominate
American antidiscrimination law, United States v. Virginia notwithstanding.
It would seem that the real achievement from an antidiscrimination perspec-
tive would be to move from disgust to humanity, or to achieve gains in civil
rights, because of, rather than despite, our differences.
101. YOSHINo, supra note 71, at 188.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 182.
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